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In this paper we estimate the potential beneﬁt of policies that eliminate a small
likelihood of economic crises. We deﬁne an economic crisis as a Depression-style
collapse of economic activity. For the U.S., based on the observed frequency of
Depression-like events, we estimate the likelihood of encountering a depression
to be about once every 83 years. Even for this small probability of moving into a
Depression-like state, the welfare gain from setting it to zero can range between
1 and 7 percent of annual consumption, in perpetuity. These estimates are large
in comparison to welfare costs typically found for microeconomic distortions and
suggest that there may be a net beneﬁt to policies directed toward preventing
economic instability.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Since Robert Lucas’s (1987) provocative argument, the existence of sizable wel-
fare gains from the pursuit of stabilization policies has become a matter of de-
bate. Lucas argued that the welfare gains from eliminating postwar variability
in aggregate consumption was something on the order of one-tenth of 1 percent
of annual U.S. consumption.
A number of papers have since explored the robustness of Lucas’s ﬁnding.
One group of authors maintained Lucas’s assumption of complete markets but
pursued the implications of alternative and less restrictive preference speciﬁca-
tions on the magnitude of the welfare gain. An incomplete list includes Obstfeld
(1994), Pemberton (1996), Dolmas (1998), Alvarez and Jermann (2000), and
Tallarini (2000). These studies have obtained larger welfare costs of business
cycles, but Otrok (2001) argues that when preference parameters are chosen to
be consistent with business-cycle behavior, the welfare costs of business cycles
are of the same order of magnitude as those obtained by Lucas.1 A second group
maintained standard preference assumptions but pursued the implications of in-
complete markets for welfare calculations. The seminal paper in this group is
Imrohoroglu (1989), who assumed that the risk of unemployment was uninsur-
able. While she obtained larger welfare costs, Atkeson and Phelan (1994) and
Krusell and Smith (1999) pointed out that if stabilization policies simply remove
the correlation in the timing of individual episodes of unemployment, the eﬀect
of stabilization policies on welfare is much smaller and might even be perverse.2
We revisit the question of the welfare gains of stabilization policies by esti-
1Ramey and Ramey (1995) have shown that, across countries, the variance of the innova-
tions to real GDP growth tends to be negatively correlated with real GDP growth, suggesting
there may be a growth beneﬁt to reduction in business-cycle volality. Barlevy (2000), Jones,
Manuelli and Stacchetti (1999), Matheron and Maury (2000), and Portier and Puch (1999)
have investigated the eﬀects of reduced cyclical volatility on capital accumulation, but there
is no consensus yet on whether these eﬀects entail sizable welfare gains.
2One study that does claim to ﬁnd sizable welfare gains from reduction of uninsured cyclical
wage risk is Beaudry and Pages (1999).
1mating the potential welfare gain from pursuing policies that prevent the occur-
rence of a Depression-style collapse of economic activity. In altering the scope
of the welfare calculation from a reduction in volatility to a reduction in the
likelihood of economic crises, we are moving the focus of the debate toward
what we think is the ultimate goal of real-world stabilization policies. In the
U.S., the various laws aimed at stabilizing the ﬁnancial system (such as fed-
eral insurance of bank deposits and the concomitant regulation of commercial
banks), automatic stabilizers (such as the state-run system of unemployment
insurance), and the authority to conduct discretionary monetary and ﬁscal pol-
icy (the Employment Act of 1946) came into being during the Depression years
or shortly thereafter. Aside from providing partial relief from unemployment
and ﬁnancial loss, the main intent of these policies was to prevent another oc-
currence of a depression. Formally speaking, the intent of these policies seems
more consistent with an eﬀort to eliminate the lower tail of the distribution of
individual consumption rather than a mean-preserving shrinkage of both the
upper and lower tails.3 Consequently, a calculation of the potential welfare gain
from the pursuit of stabilization policies is incomplete if no attempt is made to
quantify the gain from a reduction in the likelihood of economic crises.
To further motivate the project, Figure 1 plots the annual unemployment
rate for the period 1900 to 1998. The striking aspect of this time series is the
extraordinary rise in unemployment between the years 1930 and 1939, generally
identiﬁed in history as the Depression years.4 T h er i s ei se x t r a o r d i n a r yn o t
only because it has not been repeated but also because there is no correspond-
3The focus of the welfare cost of business cycles literature is on this eﬀe c ta si se v i d e n t ,f o r
instance, in Alvarez and Jermann (2000).
4For the period 1900-1940, the Lebergott series for industrial unemployment was con-
structed by dividing the total number of unemployed workers reported in Lebergott’s Table
A-3 by the sum of unemployed workers and nonfarm workers also reported in that table.
This construction assumes that most unemployed workers were in nonfarm occupations. The
unemployment rates for 1941 and later are just those reported by the BLS. The Romer se-
ries was constructed by applying the corrections suggested by Romer (1986) to the industrial
unemployment rate series.
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Figure 1: Unemployment Rate 1900-1998
ing episode involving a steep decline in unemployment rates. Indeed, with an
average unemployment rate of about 8 percent in non-Depression years, it is
impossible for the unemployment rate to fall below this average as much as it
rose above it during the Depression. In short, it is diﬃcult to view Figure 1 and
not think of the Depression as a huge, potentially preventable, lapse from the
normal workings of the economy.
We take the deﬁning characteristic of an economic crisis to be a very high
unemployment rate of workers, similar to what was experienced in the U.S.
during the Depression. The question we ask is: “What fraction of annual con-
sumption would a worker be willing to pay to set the current probability of
encountering a Depression-like event to zero?” To answer this question we con-
struct an environment with the following features. There is a continuum of
workers who encounter stochastic employment opportunities. The probability
3of ﬁnding employment depends on the aggregate state of the economy. One of
these aggregate states corresponds to an economic crisis where the probability
of ﬁnding employment in the private sector is much lower relative to the other
aggregate states. Workers cannot buy insurance against shocks to their employ-
ment status in the depression state, but they can self-insure by holding stocks
of an asset whose return is lower than the (common) rate of time preference of
individuals.5 This is perhaps the simplest environment that permits an analysis
of the welfare consequences of eliminating the likelihood of economic crises.
Our calculations start with an estimate of the current likelihood of depres-
sions, the likelihood that we set to zero in our welfare experiments. We obtain
an estimate of this likelihood by ﬁtting a three-state Markov chain to the ob-
served monthly chronology of expansions, contractions, and depressions (in the
U.S.) for the period 1900 to 1998.6 In ﬁtting one Markov chain to the entire
period we are ignoring any diﬀerence in the likelihood of depressions between
pre- and post-Depression eras. We take the conservative position that the fact
that no economic crisis has occurred since Depression-era stabilization policies
went into place reﬂects luck rather than design. Under this assumption, we
estimate the current likelihood of moving into a depression to be once every
1000 months (or once every 83 years).7 For the baseline calibration, the steady-
state welfare gain from setting this small probability to zero is 187 percent of
annual consumption, in perpetuity. We ﬁnd that 58 percent of the total gain
in welfare can be attributed to changes in second and higher-order moments of
the (individual-level) consumption process, including a decline in variance. The
remainder comes from an increase in mean consumption. Sensitivity analysis
indicates that the gain could be as low as 13 percent or as high as 66 percent.
Higher estimates are associated with larger contribution of changes in consump-
5This assumption is consistent with the general equilibrium implications of imperfect in-
surance, as shown, for instance, by Aiyagari (1994).
6An alternative approach to estimating the likelihood of a Depression-like event is to link
it to the equity premium, as is done in Rietz (1988) and Danthine and Donaldson (1998).
7In ﬁtting one Markov chain we are also ignoring any diﬀerences in the frequency of oc-
curences of non-depression states before and after the Depression.
4tion volatility. For the experiment that generated the 66 percent gain, a full
80 percent of the total gain resulted from a reduction in consumption volatility
(and changes in higher-order moments).
De Long and Summers (1988) made a criticism of Lucas-style welfare-cost
calculations that may appear related to our work but is actually quite diﬀer-
ent. These authors took the view that successful stabilization policies “ﬁll in
business cycle troughs without shaving oﬀ business cycle peaks,” and so reduce
the average unemployment rate and have a ﬁrst-order eﬀect on welfare (see also
Cohen (2000)). In contrast, our welfare calculations assume that stabilization
policies can eliminate crises but not ordinary recessions; in fact, we assume that
stabilization policies work by turning what might have been a depression into
an ordinary recession.8 Furthermore, our calculations allow for the eﬀects of
uninsured income risk. This element of realism is important because, as noted
above, in most of our experiments the majority of the welfare gains come from
changes in second and higher-order moments of the consumption process, in-
cluding a decline in its variance. In fact, we document that a framework that
ignores the risk of earnings loss from unemployment (as would, for instance, a
representative agent model) predicts substantially lower welfare gains from an
elimination of a Depression-like state.
Our study could also serve as a useful input into debates concerning the
correct response of policy to the economic and ﬁnancial crises that occurred
around the world in the 1990s. At the risk of over-simplifying a complex issue,
the types of policies discussed or implemented can be classiﬁed as belonging to
one of two types: policies that seek to prevent a repeat occurrence of a crisis
and policies that seek to implement a recovery in the midst of a crisis. The ﬁrst
8Interestingly, in a commentary on DeLong and Summers’ paper, Martin Bailey pointed out
that the most compelling case in favor of DeLong and Summers’ general point that stabilization
policies may raise average incomes was the experience of the Great Depression, and he reasoned
that “stabilization policies should be designed to avoid persistent downturns such as the Great
Depression” (p. 494 of DeLong and Summers). Our paper makes the quantitative case for
stabilization policies on precisely this ground.
5group includes policies that seek to regulate ﬁnancial trades thought to pose a
risk of ﬁnancial and economic crises. Since regulations generally interfere with
the normal working of markets and impose eﬃciency costs, there is always a
question as to how extensive they should be. By providing a methodology for
assessing the gains from eliminating economic crises (and giving an estimate for
a speciﬁc type of crisis), our paper provides an important ingredient currently
missing in the cost-beneﬁt analysis of crisis-related regulation.
2 Environment
The economy evolves through good (),b a d() and depression () times that
have implications for employment prospects. The state of the economy  ∈
{} is assumed to follow a ﬁrst-order Markov process. The transition matrix











where, for example, Pr{+1 = | = } = 
The economy consists of a large number of inﬁnitely lived individuals who












 consumption in period t, 	 ∈ (01) is the discount factor and 0
is the relative risk aversion parameter (for  =1 the function is taken to be ln
function).
Individuals are endowed with one indivisible unit of time each period. Each
individual receives an employment opportunity that has one of two states,  ∈
{} where  stands for the employed state and  for the unemployed state. If
6 =  the individual produces  units of the consumption good in the business
sector, and if  = , the individual produces  units of the consumption good
in the non-business sector, where 0 1 Without loss of generality, we set
 =1 
The individual-speciﬁc employment state is assumed to follow a ﬁrst-order















where, for example, Pr{+1 = | = +1 = } = 

 is the probability that
an individual will be employed in good times at  +1given the individual was
unemployed in period 
The overall employment prospects faced by each individual depend on both
the aggregate and individual states; that is, on the six pairs ()∈ {}
and  ∈ {} These six pairs are denoted by 16,w h e r e1 stands
for employed in a good state, 2 stands for unemployed in a good state, 3
stands for employed in a bad state, 4 stands for unemployed in a bad state,
5 stands for employed in a depression state, and 6 stands for unemployed
in a depression state. The process governing  is a ﬁrst-order Markov process





,w h e r ePr{+1 = 	 |  = 
}
= 	
 The transition probabilities are determined by Λ and Λ.F o re x a m p l e ,
if  = 1, then the probability of +1 = 2 i.e., 21 is given by 


The market arrangement in the baseline model is as follows. Individuals can
purchase unemployment insurance in the two non-depression states but not in
the depression state. Given this (partial) incompleteness in insurance markets,
individuals may have an incentive to self-insure and we assume they can do
so by holding stocks of an asset with zero real return. We defer a discussion
of these assumptions to later in the paper but note here that alternative asset
market assumptions are explored in the study. Individuals enter period  with
individual savings  held over from the previous period. An individual’s budget





() is the individual’s consumption and () is the individual’s post-
insurance income.
The maximization problem faced by an individual in this economy can be
represented as a discounted dynamic program. Let  = =  +1 = 0
and +1 = 0 Then, the Bellman equation for this program is:










Φ(0) (0 0) (1)
subject to

 = ()+ − 0 ≥ 0 (2)
Since individuals face idiosyncratic shocks in the depression state, they may
hold diﬀerent levels of savings. Let () be the probability that an individual








where Ξ(0)={ : 0 = 0()} Under mild regularity conditions (ergodicity
of the Markov process and the absence of cyclically moving subsets) the sequence
of recursively deﬁned distributions converges to a unique invariant distribution
() from any initial distribution. The distribution () gives the fraction
of time an individual is in state ()
83 Estimates of the Aggregate State Transition
Matrix
In order to estimate the aggregate state transition matrix we proceed by con-
structing a history of these aggregate states. We begin with the monthly NBER
business-cycle chronology, which dates from December 1854. We associate
NBER expansions with the good state and NBER contractions with the bad
state. This two-state history is then augmented with a deﬁnition of what it
means to be in a depression. If that deﬁnition is observed to be satisﬁed by
some month, then that month’s NBER classiﬁcation is changed to the depres-
sion state.
As noted in the introduction, we take the deﬁning characteristic of a depres-
sion to be a very high incidence of unemployment among industrial workers.
But unemployment rate data are available only for the period beginning 1900,
and for the pre-WWII portion of that period, it is available at an annual fre-
quency only. Because of this data limitation, we conﬁne our three-state history
to the period 1900 to 1998.9
For our baseline calculation, we classiﬁed all months of any year in which the
unemployment rate exceeded 17 percent as depression months. This deﬁnition
simply picks out the 120 months corresponding to the 1930-1939 period gen-
erally known as the “Depression years.”10 Accordingly, we changed the NBER
classiﬁcation of these months to the depression state. An alternative deﬁni-
tion considered later in the paper classiﬁes all months of any year in which the
unemployment rate exceeded 20 percent as depression months.11
9There is some fragmentary information on unemployment rates for the last decade of the
nineteenth century (see, for instance, Lebergott (1964, Table A-15), Romer (1986, Table 9)
and Keyssar (1977, Ch. 2)). It appears that for 5 out of those 10 years, industrial nemploy-
ment rates were very high. In an earlier version of this paper we showed that including this
information raises the estimate of the welfare gains from eliminating depressions.
10Cole and Ohanian (1999) also identify the 10 years between 1930 and 1939 as the period
during which output remained below trend.
11A more sophisticated alternative would be to ﬁt a 3-state regime to the unemployment
9Given this three-state history, the maximum likelihood estimate of 
	 the
()th element of the aggregate state transition matrix, is the ratio of the
number of times the economy switched from state  to state  to the number of
times the economy was observed to be in state  (Ross (1972) pp. 240-242).12
Implementing this procedure for the whole sample yields the following estimate
of Λ with standard errors in parentheses below:
b Λ =

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
The estimated matrix has several noteworthy features. First, because there
is only one depression episode in our sample, there is only one transition into
and one transition out of the depression state. In the three-state history we
construct, the depression follows contractionary months and is followed by ex-
pansionary months. Hence  =  =0  Second, the estimated matrix implies
that conditional on not being in a depression, the probability of falling into one
is 00010 Third, the unconditional probability of a depression is 00975 which
rate data using the procedure described in Hamilton (1989). We followed our simple procedure
because for the pre-WWII period the NBER chronology is likely to be a better proxy for the
frequency of good and bad times than any that can be inferred from the noisy unemployment
series (see Romer (1986) for a discussion of the pitfalls of the pre-WWII unemployment series
for cyclical analysis).
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Given the Markov structure of our problem, the asymptotic standard errors of these estimates
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10is orders of magnitude larger than the conditional probability. The large dis-
crepancy between these two probabilities reﬂects the fact that the depression
state is very persistent. This discrepancy is one reason why the welfare loss
from the possibility of a Depression-like event is relatively large, even though
the probability of encountering a Depression-like event, conditional on not being
in one, is quite small.13
A word about the precision of these estimates. The fact that there is only
one depression episode in our sample might be thought to imply that none of the
parameters relating to the third state (the third column and row of the Λ matrix)
can be reliably estimated. That’s not necessarily true. According to our history,
the economy spent about 1,070 months in non-depression states. Thus, there
were many instances in which the economy could have gone into a depression
but didn’t. The fact that the depression state was encountered only once out
of more than 1000 trials suggests we can be quite conﬁdent that the probability
of moving into a depression state is very low. Similarly, the economy spent 120
months in the depression state before moving out of it. The fact that it took
more than 100 trials for the economy to leave the depression state implies we
can be reasonably conﬁdent that the probability of continuing in the depression
state is quite high. As we shall see, these two features of a depression state,
namely, the low probability of encountering one and its persistence once it is
encountered, are the economically signiﬁcant features.14
13The unconditional probability of a good state is 06951 and the unconditional probability
of a bad state is 02074
14We note, however, that the standard errors reported in parentheses are asymptotic stan-
dard errors and needn’t be good estimates of the sampling variance in “small” samples. To
investigate the small sample properties of our maximum likelihood estimate of Λ,w er a n
Monte Carlo simulations where the data generation process is given by b Λ.A se x p e c t e d ,t h e
standard errors from the Monte Carlo simulations were larger than the asymptotic standard
errors. Furthermore, we found an upward bias in the estimates of  and . Since correct-
ing b Λ for these biases only led to higher welfare gains of eliminating the depression-like state,
w er e t a i n e dt h em o r ec o n s e r v a t i v ee s t i m a t e so fb Λ reported in the paper.
114 Calibration of Other Parameters
The calibration of the remaining parameters involves selecting parameter values
for the elements of the individual-level transition matrices Λ the preference pa-
rameters 	 and  the earnings-loss parameter  and the post-insurance income
terms ()
The Individual State Transition Matrix
The individual-level state transition matrix for each aggregate state is built
up from two pieces of information pertaining to that state, namely the average
unemployment rate in that state and the average duration of unemployment
spells in that state.
The average unemployment rate in the good, bad, and depression states was
ﬁxed at the average unemployment rate for these states in the whole sample.
These were 533 percent, 786 percent, and 2348 percent, respectively. Since
the unemployment rate data are available at only annual frequencies for the
pre-WWII era, the average unemployment rate for each state was calculated
for annual data. All non-Depression years in which there were at least nine ex-
pansionary months were classiﬁed as “good” years and all other non-Depression
years as “bad” years.15
The duration of unemployment spells in good and bad times is based on the
monthly average duration of unemployment spells reported by the BLS. These
were determined to be 275 months during expansions and 375 months during
15Because the unemployment rate falls during expansions and rises during contractions,
our procedure for calibrating  and  u n d e r e s t i m a t e st h et r u ed i ﬀerence between these
parameters. As a check, we estimated the average unemployment rate for the last six months of
each expansion and the average unemployment rate for the last six months of each contraction
in the postwar period (according to Romer (1986), the unemployment rate process for 1900-
1928 period is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from that in the postwar era, once allowance is made
for likely measurement errors in the prewar unemployment data). The estimates were 470
percent and 674 percent, respectively. Since this method of estimating and  leads to
uniformly lower values than what we estimate for our baseline calibration, we found that they
led to higher welfare gains (of eliminating the likelihood of depressions) than those reported
later in the paper.
12contractions. The only data on the duration of unemployment spells that we
could ﬁnd for the Depression were for 1930 and 1931. By early 1930, 56 percent
of male unemployed workers had been without work for at least nine weeks.
The special census of unemployment undertaken in January 1931 reported that
of the male workers unemployed in Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Chicago,
and Los Angeles, 453 percent, 609 percent, 452 percent, 610 percent, and 332
percent, respectively, had been jobless for at least 18 weeks. In eﬀect, the median
unemployment duration had doubled in less than a year. The fact that the
unemployment rate remained elevated for the next seven years suggests that the
median duration of unemployment by the end of the Depression was probably
a lot higher than 18 weeks. We ﬁxed the average duration of unemployment
spells in the depression state as 20 months, more than four times the median
duration seen in 1931.16
The choice of average duration of unemployment spells for each aggregate
state ﬁxes 





). We chose the remaining
elements to match the average unemployment rate in each aggregate state. Note
that the evolution of the aggregate unemployment rate is given by:
 = −1
()
 +( 1− −1)
()

where () ∈ {} Since 

 etc. depend only on the current state, 
converges to a constant if the state remains unchanged for some length of time.
For each aggregate state, these limiting unemployment rates solve:
 = 

 +( 1− )


We chose the values of 

∈ {} so that  and  matched 533
percent, 786 percent, and 2348 percent, respectively.17
16We have experimented with setting the average duration of unemployment in the depres-
sion to 10 months. For reasons explained later in the paper, this change didn’t aﬀect the
estimate of the welfare gain from elimination of depressions very much at all.
17These choices imply that average unemployment rate in the good state is somewhat larger
than , and the average unemployment rate in the bad and depression states is somewhat
less than  and  respectively. However, since all three states are highly persistent, these
discrepancies are minor.
13Preference and Earning-Loss Parameters
We set 	 =0 9946, which is equivalent to an annual discount rate of 6
percent. We arrived at this number by assuming a rate of time preference equal
to 4 percent at an annual rate as well as assuming that the constant monthly
survival probability is equal to 1−1(40∗12) so that individuals have a working
life of 40 years. We set the risk aversion parameter,  to 3
The value of  is given by “home production.” According to Greenwood,
Rogerson, and Wright (1995), “attempts to measure the value of the output
of home-production come up with numbers between 20 and 50 percent of the
value of measured market GNP.” To be conservative, we set the earning loss
parameter  to 05 in the baseline calibration.18
Insurance Payments
While we take a high unemployment rate of workers as a deﬁning charac-
teristic of a depression, such an event is likely to have consequences for the
functioning of asset markets as well. In particular, suppose there are two kinds
of assets, one of which is issued by the business sector and another by the gov-
ernment. In normal times, the return on the business-sector asset is close to the
rate of discount while the return on the government asset is zero. In a depres-
sion, the return on the government asset is still zero, but the business-sector
asset becomes worthless. In this world, workers will accumulate stocks of the
business-sector asset to self-insure against the risk of unemployment in normal
times but use the government asset to insure against unemployment during de-
pressions. If the rate of return on the business-sector asset is close to the rate of
discount, we know from Bewley (1977) that the worker will accumulate enough
of the asset to almost perfectly insure against unemployment risk during normal
times. Therefore, a rough way to capture this situation is to assume that both
employed and unemployed workers receive the per capita endowment in the
18Darby (1976) pointed out that workers engaged in government relief programs during the
Depression were counted as unemployed. Darby also reports that the average wage earned by
these “unemployed” workers during the years 1930-1939 was about 41 percent of the average
wage during those years, which is lower than our baseline calibration of 50 percent.
14good and bad states (so there is no risk of loss of income due to unemployment
in these times) but confront the risk of unemployment in the depression state.
Speciﬁcally, for  =  and  we set ()=( 1− )+ for all , while we
set ()=1and ()=.19 Later, we examine what happens if insurance
is not available in any of the states and if it’s available in all states. This last
case corresponds to doing welfare calculation in the context of representative
agent.
5 The Response of Per Capita Consumption in
a Depression
Given our objective, it’s important for the calibration to deliver the decline
in per capita consumption observed during the Depression years. To see how
well the model captures the decline in per capita consumption during the Great
Depression, we simulated our model with the observed history of aggregate
states, starting with an initial distribution of asset holdings corresponding to the
average over good states (since 1900 was an expansionary year).20 Figure 2 plots
the computed percentage deviations of the simulated per capita consumption
against the percentage deviation in actual per capita consumption.21 This is
done for two polar opposite assumptions concerning the extent to which non-
business-sector income is measured in real GDP. The simulated path shown by
19The aggregate unemployment rate is not equal to  in the ﬁrst few periods following
the economy’s arrival into state  However, switches between aggregate states are relatively
rare and convergence to  is always very rapid. Living with this minor discrepancy saves us
from putting  as another state variable in the dynamic program.
20We obtain decision rules for optimal asset holdings by successive approximations on the
value function  (	
). We discretize the state space of asset holdings to lie between 0 and
10.8 in increments of 0.027 for a total of 401 grid points. The upper bound is roughly equal
to 11 months of income if the employed state continues for that long. In equilibrium, this
constraint is never binding.
21The consumption series is based, in part, on the annual Kendrick real consumption se-
ries for 1889-1953 reported in Appendix B of Gordon (1986), deﬂated by population. The
percentage deviations shown in the ﬁgure are taken from a quadratic trend.






























































Figure 2: Simulated & Actual Per Capita Consumption Paths with Home Pro-
duction Measured or Not Measured
the dashed line assumes that all of the non-business-sector income received by
an unemployed individual is measured in real GDP. Under this assumption, per
capita consumption drops about 16 percent but gradually recovers to a decline of
about 10-12 percent by the end of the Depression. When the economy emerges
from the Depression, per capita consumption rises sharply to around 10 percent
above trend and then declines to its normal level value by around 1945. The
dotted line shows what happens if non-business-sector income is not measured
in real GDP. In this case, consumption declines about 24 percent in 1930, about
26 percent in 1931, and then recovers to a decline of about 24 percent toward
the end of the Depression. The drop in per capita consumption is now much
steeper because for unemployed individuals only consumption in excess of non-
business-sector income is included in aggregate consumption and real GDP.
16As is evident, these two cases “bracket” the actual decline in per capita con-
sumption during the Depression. In the data, aggregate per capita consumption
doesn’t fall below trend until 1931 and reaches its trough of around 19 percent
in 1933. Then there is a recovery, with the path of consumption ending up
in the neighborhood of the simulated consumption path by around 1945. The
fact that, in comparison to the simulations, actual Depression-era per capita
consumption is more volatile and reaches its trough later should not be too
surprising. In the data, the Depression-era unemployment rate is more volatile,
peaking at 30 percent. Furthermore, in the simulations individuals know right
away they are in the Depression whereas the realization that something had
gone very wrong was gradual in reality. These diﬀerences suggest that a better
metric for judging how well the Depression is captured is to compare the cumu-
lative consumption loss between 1930 and 1945. If non-business-sector income
is measured, the cumulative consumption loss is 76 percent of mean aggregate
consumption, and if it’s not measured it’s 227 percent. In the data, the cumu-
lative consumption loss over the same period is 107 percent. If we assume that
23 percent of non-business-sector income goes unmeasured, the cumulative loss
in consumption in the model matches that in the data.
In summary, the predictions of the baseline model for the path of per capita
consumption during a depression does not appear to be grossly inconsistent with
observations. We now turn to our welfare comparisons.
6 Welfare Estimates
We wish to estimate the utility gain from moving to an environment for which




00745 09216 + 00039


The oﬀ-diagonal elements of this matrix are identical to the corresponding ele-
ments of b Λ as is  But the probability of remaining in the bad state is now
17higher by 00039, the probability of moving into a depression from a bad state
in the b Λ matrix. The assumption here is that stabilization policies prevent or-
dinary recessions from turning into depressions. The individual level transition
matrices for the good and bad state remain the same, and the parameters  	
and  a r ea s s u m e dt ob et h es a m ea sw e l l .L e t ∗() be the value function
for this new, depression-proof, economy.
The welfare calculations are done in two ways. Imagine that the three-
state economy has attained its stochastic steady state. At some random date,
individuals are given the choice of living in an environment with Λ∗ At that
instant, the economy will be in one of three possible states, and there will be
a joint distribution of individuals across asset holdings and employment status.
We can imagine asking each individual in this distribution the maximum he is
willing to pay each period in the two-state depression-proof environment for the
privilege of living in that environment.
In the ﬁrst type of welfare calculation, which is our preferred type, we assume
that each individual begins the new regime with his current asset-holding and
employment status. In addition, we assume that if the economy is in the good
o rb a ds t a t e ,t h e nt h en e wr e g i m ew i l lb e g i ni nt h a ts t a t ea sw e l l ,a n di ft h e
economy is in the depression state, then the new regime will begin in the bad
state. Thus, the fraction of consumption the individual is willing to give up if
he is currently in state () ≤ 4 is found by computing 1 − (),w h e r e
() solves:
 ()=()1− ∗()
If the economy is in a depression, then (5) and (6) are computed as
follows:
 (5) = (5)1− ∗(3)
 (6) = (6)1− ∗(4)
Denoting the invariant measure for the (three aggregate state) depression-prone
environment by b () (this probability distribution is the unconditional prob-
18ability of an individual having assets  in state ) the average gain in welfare





In the second type of calculation we assume that each individual is oﬀered
the average lifetime utility in the depression-proof environment. In this case
() is given by:
 ()=()1− ¯  ∗




 ∗() ∗() with ∗() being the invariant distribu-





We refer to this measure as the steady-state gain in welfare. The diﬀerence be-
tween our preferred measure and the steady-state measure is that the former
takes account of the fact that after the regime change individuals will want
to decumulate assets, since there is less uncertainty in the new depression-free
regime. The additional consumption permitted by this decumulation along the
transition path to the new steady state is taken into account in our preferred
measure but ignored by the steady-state one.
19Table 1
Welfare Gains From Eliminating Depressions and Cycles
(As a Percentage of Per Period Consumption)
Eliminating Depressions Gains From Eliminating Cycles
Total Gain SS Gain Lucas’s Estimate Imrohoroglu’s Estimate
187 170 001 03
Both calculations are reported in Table 1. The total welfare gain (including
the gain from the decumulation of assets along the transition path) is 187
percent of consumption per month (or per year) and the steady-state gain is
170 percent.22 To put these numbers in perspective, note that Lucas estimated
the welfare gain from eliminating all cyclical volatility in the postwar era to be
001 percent of consumption and Imrohoroglu estimated it to be 03 percent.
These authors computed steady-state gains so the relevant comparison is with
our steady-state gain measure. We ﬁnd that the gain from getting rid of a
Depression-like state is 170 times Lucas’s (1987) estimate of the gains from
eliminating cycles and about 6.5 times Imrohoroglu’s (1989) estimate.23
Experimentation reveals that the welfare gains from eliminating depressions
vary approximately linearly with the likelihood of encountering a depression. If
we thought that the true likelihood of encountering a Depression-like event was
actually once every 1600 years (rather than once every 83 years), that would
cut our estimated welfare gains by a factor of about 20. Note that if the true
likelihood of encountering a depression was really once in 1600 years, the chance
of encountering a depression episode in a 83-year sample would be around 5
percent. Thus, a welfare gain of around 0094 percent (=1 87 ÷20) corresponds
to the lower bound of a 95 percent conﬁdence interval of our point estimate.
22I tm a yb ei n t e r e s tt on o t et h a tconditional on being in a depression, individuals are willing
to pay, on average, 645 percent of annual consumption to receive the steady-state utility of
the depression-free economy.
23The total gain from elimination of the depression state depends on the value of  When
this number is set closer to the value assumed in Imrohoroglu (025),t h et o t a lw e l f a r eg a i ni s
around 20 times her estimate of the cost of business cycles.
20Even under a most conservative estimate of the likelihood of depressions, the
welfare gain is more than nine times larger than Lucas’s estimate of the welfare
gain from eliminating cycles.
Where do these gains come from? Table 2, which lists the key operating
characteristics of the two economies, indicates three relevant diﬀerences. First,
average asset holdings go from being 041 of monthly earnings in the 3-state
environment to 0 in the 2-state economy. Because the diﬀerence between the
total gain in welfare and the steady-state gain is 017 percent, we can infer that
91 (=( 1 87 − 17) ÷ 187) percent of the total welfare gain is due to the fact
that individuals need to hold fewer assets in the new regime.
Table 2








3 −  04077 13057 09628 00563
2 −  00 0 9704 00054
Second, average consumption rises by 00076 units in the 2-state economy,
an increase of 078 percent (=0 0076 ÷ 09704) relative to mean consumption
in the 2-state economy. Since an individual would be willing to forgo exactly
00076 units of consumption for a gain of 00076 units, we can infer that 078
percentage point of the total gain welfare gain results from this source. Thus,
increase in mean income accounts for 417 (=( 0 78÷187)×100) percent of the
total welfare gain.
Third, the volatility of individual consumption is lower by a factor of 10
in the 2-state economy. Since the ﬁrst two eﬀects account for 508 percent
of the total gain, we can infer that the remaining 492 percent of the gain
must be due to reduction in the variance of consumption and changes in other
higher-order moments of the consumption process. Thus the most important
contributor to the total welfare gain is the reduction in the volatility of the
consumption process. However, since the only reason individuals accumulate a
21buﬀer stock of assets is to dampen ﬂuctuations in consumption, the reduction
in uncertainty associated with the elimination of the depression state accounts
for 583 (=9 1+4 9 2) percent of the total welfare gain.
T h em o s td r a m a t i cd i ﬀerence in the operating characteristics of the two
economies is in the volatility of individual consumption. In the 2-state economy,
the volatility of consumption is low because unemployment insurance makes the
volatility in an individual’s post-transfer income equal to the cyclical volatil-
ity in per capita earnings. The cyclical variability in per capita earnings is
low enough that individuals do not ﬁnd it in their interests to accumulate the
zero-return asset to buﬀer their consumption against these ﬂuctuations. Hence,
in every period individuals set their consumption equal to their post-transfer
income (which leads to the mean level of asset holdings being zero). In the
3-state economy individuals do not ﬁnd it optimal to accumulate assets in the
two non-depression states even though they are aware that if the depression ma-
terializes unemployment insurance will cease. Consequently, when a depression
does materialize the consumption paths of all individuals changes dramatically.
Evidently, the probability of the depression state is low enough that individuals
do not ﬁnd it worth their while to save for it in advance via a low-return as-
set. Those who become unemployed at the start of the depression are the worst
aﬀected: they have no buﬀer stock of assets and no insurance and their con-
sumption moves down with their earnings one-for-one. Those who continue to
be employed recognize the possibility of earnings loss due to unemployment and
also reduce their consumption in an eﬀo r tt oa c c u m u l a t eab u ﬀer stock of assets.
These big drops in consumption at the start of the depression contribute to the
relatively high volatility of individual consumption in the 3-state economy.24
24These changes in individual and aggregate consumption occur even though a depression is
assumed not to aﬀect the earnings of employed and unemployed agents. Thus, we ignore any
decline in productivity that may have occurred during depressions. Taking such eﬀects into
account would only raise our welfare gain estimates. Also, our study ignores any interaction
between an individual’s unemployment history and his or her business-sector earnings. If
unemployment spells reduce future employment earnings, the welfare gain from elimination
of depressions will be much larger.
22The drop in everyone’s consumption explains the drop in per capita con-
sumption at the start of a depression in Figure 2. As the depression proceeds,
the rate of asset accumulation of employed individuals begins to decline as they
get closer to their target buﬀer stock of assets (of about 8 months of employed
income) and their consumption begins to recover. This is the main reason
aggregate consumption recovers after the initial drop. Another factor that con-
tributes to the recovery is that individuals who become unemployed later in the
depression experience less of a decline in consumption because they get time to
accumulate assets.
T h ef a c tt h a tas i g n i ﬁcant welfare gain from elimination of the depression
state comes from a reduction in consumption volatility gives our ﬁndings a ﬂavor
similar to more recent studies of the welfare cost of business cycles. Storesletten,
Telmer and Yaron (2001) and Krebs (forthcoming) show that the welfare gain
from the elimination of cyclical variation in uninsured idiosyncratic risk can be
quite large if permanent income shocks are an important component of this risk.
While we don’t model permanent idiosyncratic income shocks, unemployment
during a depression, and the depression itself, are quite persistent states. People
who become unemployed during a depression can expect their income to be low
for a relatively long period of time, a fact that contributes to the volatility of
consumption in the 3-state economy.
7 The Role of Uninsured Income Risk
The size of the welfare gain depends on the assumption that earnings loss from
unemployment cannot be insured in the depression state. This becomes evident
if we re-run our experiment under the assumption that unemployment insurance
is available in all states, i.e., an individual’s post-transfer income in state  is
(1−)+ for  =  Table 3 displays the operating characteristics of
the two economies.
23Table 3
The Eﬀect of Full Unemployment Insurance








3 −  000 9628 00266
2 −  000 9704 00054
Eliminating uninsured employment risk eliminates the need to save in all ag-
gregate states. The uncertainty in post-transfer earnings is too low to overcome
the diﬀerence in the rate of return on savings (zero) and the rate of discount (6
percent, annualized). Since decumulation of assets is no longer an eﬀect, there
is very little diﬀerence between the total and steady-state gain in welfare. There
is still a substantial reduction in consumption volatility in the 2-state economy
arising purely from the fact that variation in post-transfer earnings (or, equiv-
alently in per capita earnings) is greater in the 3-state economy compared with
the 2-state economy. However, the increase in average consumption in the 2-
state economy (which is still 00076 units or 078 percent of mean consumption
in 2-state economy) now accounts for 804 percent of the total welfare gain.
Since welfare calculations for the economy with full unemployment insurance
is equivalent to welfare calculations with a representative agent, these ﬁndings
establish that a representative agent approach to our problem will lower the
estimate of the total gain in welfare almost 50 percent and attribute most of the
gain to an increase in average consumption resulting from the elimination of the
depression state. In this sense, uninsured unemployment risk during depression
matters.25
25It’s worth noting that our representative agent estimate of 02 (=( 0 98 − 078)) percent
for the welfare gain resulting purely from a reduction in volatility is very close to Lucas’
(representative agent) estimate of the welfare gain from elimination of pre-WWII cyclical
volatility. As noted in his 1987 book (pp. 26-28), variance in de-trended (log) aggregate
consumption in the pre-WWII era is 00015 which, when multiplied by 1
2 for  =3  gives a
welfare gain estimate of 00023 or 023 percent.
24How do the results change if we assume that insurance against earnings loss is
not available in any state? Table 4 displays the operating characteristics of such
an economy. The total gain in welfare from the elimination of the depression
state is now 156 percent and the steady-state gain is 14 percent. With regard
to the contribution of the three diﬀerent channels, the reduction in buﬀer stock
assets contributes about 103 (= (156 − 14) ÷ 156) percent, the increase in
mean consumption (which is still 078 percent of average consumption in the 2-
state economy) contributes 50 (=078÷156 ) percent, and the remaining 397
percent results from a reduction in variance and other changes in the higher-
order moments of the consumption process.
Table 4
The Eﬀect of the Absence of Unemployment Insurance








3 −  223 116 09628 00716
2 −  186 053 09704 00543
The reason gains are somewhat lower than in our baseline model is evident
from the behavior of asset holdings. Because individuals now face the risk of
earnings loss from unemployment in all aggregate states, they ﬁnd it in their
interests to accumulate a buﬀer stock of assets not only in the depression state
but also in good and bad states. One consequence of this behavior is that
when the depression materializes, all individuals are somewhat better prepared
than in the baseline model; individuals who lose their jobs at the start of the
depression now have some savings to cushion the blow, and individuals who
continue to remain employed have only to add to their existing buﬀer stock of
assets rather than start from scratch. Consequently, the variability of individual
consumption in the depression-prone economy is somewhat less now than in the
baseline model. This works to reduce the welfare gain from an elimination
of the depression state. In this case, the reduction in uncertainty accounts
for 50 percent (103+3 9 7) of the welfare gain. The key lesson here is that
25improvements in risk-sharing that are unlikely to survive a depression-like event
make it more important to eliminate the possibility of such events through
stabilization policies.26
8 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we report the sensitivity of our results to changes in key parameter
values. The results are collected in Table 5.
Table 5













) TG SS RU
Baseline 041 096 007 0 097 001 187 170 583
 =0 21 47 094 009 0 095 001 659 600 804
 =1 00 17 096 006 0 097 001 130 122 400
 ≥ 020 023 096 005 0 097 001 158 148 608
Growth = 2 % 025 096 006 0 097 001 196 180 599
For ease of comparison, the ﬁrst set of results are those from the baseline
model. The next line reports results if the income in the unemployed state is
set at 20 percent of income in the employed state (this is the lower bound on
the income from home production reported in the Greenwood, Rogerson and
Wright study mentioned earlier). As one would expect, average consumption is
now lower, average savings higher, and volatility of consumption higher than in
the baseline model. The total gain from eliminating the depression state is now
659 percent while the steady state gain is 6 percent. With regard to the sources
26A second lesson is that real-world features that impinge on a household’s level of precau-
tionary savings, but which are ignored in this paper, could have a bearing on the calculation
of welfare gains. One such feature is habit formation, which is known to increase the level
of precautionary savings by hefty amounts (Diaz, Pijoan-Mas, and Rios-Rull (forthcoming)).
However, because habit formation also increases the utility loss from steep declines in con-
sumption, introducing this feature may increase both precautionary savings and our estimate
of the welfare gain.
26of the gain, the ﬁnal column reports the combined percentage contribution due
to reduction in uncertainty (the contribution from the decumulation of assets
plus the contribution from the reduction in volatility of consumption), which is
804 p e r c e n to ft h et o t a lg a i ni nw e l f a r e .
The next experiment reduces the relative risk aversion parameter to 1 Rel-
ative to the baseline model, average asset holdings fall, and there is a modest
decline in the volatility of consumption. Predictably, the welfare gain estimates
are now lower, with the total gain being 13 percent and the steady state gain
122 percent. The contribution due to reduction in uncertainty is now only 40
percent.
In the third experiment, we deﬁn e dd e p r e s s i o nm o n t h st ob ea l lm o n t h so f
any year in which the unemployment rate exceeded 20 percent. We re-estimated
the aggregate state transition matrix based on this new history. Now, the period
1930-1939 is broken up into two depression episodes, one between 1930 and
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Notice that since the duration of the depression state has fallen,  has fallen
relative to the baseline. On the other hand, the two instances of transition to
the depression state raise the conditional probability of entering a depression 
relative to the baseline, and the average unemployment rate in the depression-
like state is now slightly higher as well (2498 percent versus 2348 percent in
the baseline model). The welfare calculations reveal that these changes roughly
oﬀset each other, leading to a modest decline in the welfare gains from elimina-
tion of the depression-like state. The contribution of reduction in uncertainty
27to this gain is about 61 percent.
This experiment also sheds light on the beneﬁt of stabilization policies that
cannot eliminate depressions but can accelerate recovery from them. In the
above experiment, the average duration of the depression state is close to 4 years,
but the depression state is about twice as likely to occur as in the baseline case.
Given the linearity of the welfare estimates in the probability of encountering
a depression, we may infer that if we reduce the probability of encountering a
depression in the above experiment so that it occurs half as often, the welfare
estimate from eliminating depressions would be cut in half. Hence, the welfare
gain from eliminating a depression state that occurs once every 83 years but has
an average duration of 4 years would be around 1582=0 79 percent. This
implies that simply reducing the average duration of the depression state to
4 years without changing its frequency of occurrence (relative to the baseline
model) would result in a total welfare gains of around 11 (=1 87 −079) percent.
This is still much larger than the gains reported in Lucas (1987).
In the ﬁnal experiment, we allow income to grow at a 2 percent annual
rate. There is a modest increase in the welfare gains from elimination of the
depression state relative to the baseline model and also a modest increase in
the percentage contribution from the reduction in uncertainty. If we denote the
monthly growth rate by  the individual acts as if his purchases of assets are
taxed at the rate  and he faces a discount factor 	(1+)1− Since 0 and
1, both forces act to restrain purchases of the asset. Consequently, people
end up being less protected from loss in earnings during a depression episode.
Consistent with this intuition, we ﬁnd that average asset holdings are about 27
percent lower in the economy with growth. On the other hand, the standard
deviation of consumption is lower in the economy with growth, which seems to
run counter to this intuition. However, the standard deviation of consumption
is importantly aﬀected by the consumption path of individuals who never lose
their jobs during the depression (and these are the majority). Since these agents
don’t accumulate as many assets as in the baseline model their consumption
28doesn’t drop as much as in the baseline model, and this shows up in less overall
volatility in aggregate consumption.
We also ran other experiments whose results are not reported because they
made little diﬀerence to the estimate of the welfare gain. In one experiment,
we varied the average duration of unemployment in the depression state. This
had a very small eﬀect on welfare because any lengthening or shortening of the
average duration needed to be oﬀset by a decrease or increase in the probabil-
ity of entering unemployment (in the depression) in order to keep the average
depression unemployment rate at 2348 percent. These oﬀsets in the incidence
of unemployment cancelled the welfare eﬀects of changes in unemployment du-
r a t i o n . I na n o t h e re x p e r i m e n t ,w el e tt h er e t u r no nt h ea s s e tv a r yw i t ht h e
depression. In particular, we viewed the asset as money and assumed that at
t h eo n s e to ft h ed e p r e s s i o nt h er e a lv a l u eo fm o n e yr o s e( b e c a u s eo faf a l li nt h e
price level) while at the the end of the depression it fell (because the decline in
the price level is reversed). This lowered the beneﬁt accruing from decumulation
of assets, since there is now a decline in the real value of assets as the economy
emerges from a depression. However, the overall change in welfare was quite
small. In the ﬁnal experiment, we assumed that the asset had a 2 percent rate
of return instead of zero, and this had a very small eﬀect on welfare as well.
9C o n c l u s i o n
Our aim in this paper was to obtain an estimate of the beneﬁt of stabilization
policies that reduce the likelihood of a Depression-style collapse of economic
activity. For the U.S., we estimate the probability of moving into a Depression-
like state to be about once in every 83 years and the welfare gain from setting
this small probability to zero ranges between 13 percent and 66 percent of
annual consumption, in perpetuity. For our baseline calibration, the welfare
gain is about 187 percent, with 58 percent of the gain coming from changes
in second and higher-order moments of the consumption process, including a
substantial decline in its variance. Higher estimates of the gain imply larger
29contributions from the induced reduction in consumption volatility.
While we have quantiﬁed the potential gain from pursuing policies that re-
duce the likelihood of economic crises, we have not said anything about the
potential costs of doing so. To take that step would require a theory of eco-
nomic instability. This is a controversial issue, but one plausible theory locates
the source of instability in the diﬃculties of coordinating trade.27 One inﬂuen-
tial example of such a theory is Diamond’s (1982) model of uncoordinated trade
in which he showed that pessimism about the possibility of meeting trading
partners can lead to self-fulﬁlling trade collapse. Another inﬂuential example is
Diamond and Dybvig’s (1983) theory of bank runs, in which pessimism about
the likelihood of getting one’s money back can lead to self-fulﬁlling banking pan-
ics. Both models suggest microeconomic interventions that can eliminate these
undesirable outcomes, with deposit insurance in the Diamond-Dybvig model be-
ing a clear example. If these models are relevant for thinking about real-world
economic crises, then it is the cost of microeconomic interventions such as de-
posit insurance that would have to be weighed against the beneﬁts of eliminating
the likelihood of economic crises.
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